{"product_id":"ordinary-objects-9780199764440","title":"Ordinary Objects","description":"Arguments that ordinary inanimate objects such as tables and chairs, sticks and stones, simply do not exist have become increasingly common and increasingly prominent. Some are based on demands for parsimony or for a non-arbitrary answer to the special composition question; others arise from\u003cbr\u003eprohibitions against causal redundancy, ontological vagueness, or co-location; and others still come from worries that a common sense ontology would be a rival to a scientific one. \u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003eUntil now, little has been done to address these arguments in a unified and systematic way. \u003cem\u003eOrdinary Objects\u003c\/em\u003e is designed to fill this gap, demonstrating that the mistakes behind all of these superficially diverse eliminativist arguments may be traced to a common source. It aims to develop an\u003cbr\u003eontology of ordinary objects subject to no such problems, providing perhaps the first sustained defense of a common sense ontology in two generations. The work done along the way addresses a number of major issues in philosophy of language and metaphysics, contributing to debates about analyticity, \u003cbr\u003eidentity conditions, co-location and the grounding problem, vagueness, overdetermination, parsimony, and ontological commitment. \u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003eIn the end, the most important result of addressing these eliminativist arguments is not merely avoiding their conclusions; examining their failings also gives us reason to suspect that many apparent disputes in ontology are pseudo-debates. For it brings into question widely-held assumptions about\u003cbr\u003ewhich uses of metaphysical principles are appropriate, which metaphysical demands are answerable, and how we should go about addressing such fundamental questions as What exists?. As a result, the work of \u003cem\u003eOrdinary Objects\u003c\/em\u003e promises to provide not only the route to a reflective understanding of our\u003cbr\u003eunreflective common-sense view, but also a better understanding of the proper methods and limits of metaphysics. \u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cem\u003eOrdinary Objects\u003c\/em\u003e is well worth reading because it sheds new light on how to preserve the credibility of familiar things.--Marianne Djuth, \u003cem\u003eThe Review of Metaphysics \u003c\/em\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003eIn \u003cem\u003eOrdinary Objects\u003c\/em\u003e, Amie Thomasson mounts a spirited and vigorous defense of the reality of ordinary objects.--Terry Horgan, \u003cem\u003eTimes Literary Supplement\u003c\/em\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cem\u003eOrdinary Objects\u003c\/em\u003e is a fine book.... [Thomasson] writes insightfully and persuasively, and she has a realistic view of what metaphysical arguments can and cannot demonstrate... she approaches metaphysical theorizing more systematically than many other recent writers, drawing attention to the ways in\u003cbr\u003ewhich questionable assumptions in one area of philosophy are undergirding seemingly powerful arguments in another. Everyone working in metaphysics should make time for this volume.--R. W. Fischer, \u003cem\u003eMetaphilosophy \u003c\/em\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003eIn \u003cem\u003eOrdinary Objects\u003c\/em\u003e, Thomasson pursues an integrated conception of ontology and metaontology. In ontology, she defends the existence of shoes, ships, and other ordinary objects. In metaontology, she defends a deflationary view of ontological inquiry, designed to suck the air out of arguments\u003cbr\u003eagainst ordinary objects. The result is an elegant and insightful defense of a common sense worldview.--Jonathan Schaffer, \u003cem\u003ePhilosophical Books \u003c\/em\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003eAmie Thomasson has written a lovely book which is certain to irritate many professional metaphysicians. But it is not just irritating: it is challenging...This book would be good supplementary text for upper-level metaphysics classes or seminars in which the sorts of arguments to which Thomasson\u003cbr\u003ereplies are also read.--Alan Sidelle, \u003cem\u003eThe Philosophical Quarterly\u003c\/em\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eAuthor:\u003c\/b\u003e Amie Thomasson\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003ePublisher:\u003c\/b\u003e Oxford University Press, USA\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003ePublished:\u003c\/b\u003e 11\/01\/2010\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003ePages:\u003c\/b\u003e 256\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eBinding Type:\u003c\/b\u003e Paperback\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eWeight:\u003c\/b\u003e 0.72lbs\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eSize:\u003c\/b\u003e 8.50h x 5.50w x 0.58d\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eISBN:\u003c\/b\u003e 9780199764440\u003cbr\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eAbout the Author\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eAmie Thomasson\u003c\/strong\u003e is Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Miami.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eThis title is not returnable\u003c\/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"Oxford University Press, USA","offers":[{"title":"Paperback","offer_id":40143906701427,"sku":"9.7802E+12","price":38.95,"currency_code":"EUR","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0555\/9255\/0515\/products\/img_513a1cc8-3b2c-4b64-8467-33ff99c1430a.jpg?v=1654608363","url":"https:\/\/bookstorenmore.com\/en-de\/products\/ordinary-objects-9780199764440","provider":"Bookstore N More","version":"1.0","type":"link"}