Oxford University Press, USA
Conceptual Link from Physical to Mental
Conceptual Link from Physical to Mental
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How are truths about physical and mental states related? Physicalism entails that non-physical truths are redescriptions of a world specifiable in narrowly physical terms. In The Conceptual Link from Physical to Mental Robert Kirk argues that physicalists must therefore hold that the physical
truth logico-conceptually entails the mental truth: it is impossible for broadly logical and conceptual reasons that the former should have held without the latter. Redescriptive physicalism is a fresh approach to the physical-to-mental connection that he bases on these ideas. Contrary to what
might have been expected, this connection does not depend on analytic truths: there are holistic but non-analytic conceptual links, explicable by means of functionalism--which, he argues, physicalism entails. Redescriptive physicalism should not be confused with a priori physicalism: although
physicalists must maintain that phenomenal truths are logico-conceptually entailed by physical truths, they must deny that they are also entailed a priori. Kripke-inspired a posteriori physicalism, on the other hand, is too weak for physicalism, and the psycho-physical identity thesis is not
sufficient for it. Though non-reductive, redescriptive physicalism is an excellent basis for dealing with the problems that mental causation raises for other non-reductive views. Cartesian intuitions of zombies and transposed qualia may seem to raise irresistible objections; Kirk shows that the
intuitions are false. As to the explanatory gap, there is certainly an epistemic gap, but it has a physicalistically acceptable explanation which deals effectively with the problem of how the physical and functional facts fix particular phenomenal facts.
Author: Robert Kirk
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
Published: 04/05/2013
Pages: 252
Binding Type: Hardcover
Weight: 1.10lbs
Size: 9.20h x 6.40w x 0.80d
ISBN: 9780199669417
truth logico-conceptually entails the mental truth: it is impossible for broadly logical and conceptual reasons that the former should have held without the latter. Redescriptive physicalism is a fresh approach to the physical-to-mental connection that he bases on these ideas. Contrary to what
might have been expected, this connection does not depend on analytic truths: there are holistic but non-analytic conceptual links, explicable by means of functionalism--which, he argues, physicalism entails. Redescriptive physicalism should not be confused with a priori physicalism: although
physicalists must maintain that phenomenal truths are logico-conceptually entailed by physical truths, they must deny that they are also entailed a priori. Kripke-inspired a posteriori physicalism, on the other hand, is too weak for physicalism, and the psycho-physical identity thesis is not
sufficient for it. Though non-reductive, redescriptive physicalism is an excellent basis for dealing with the problems that mental causation raises for other non-reductive views. Cartesian intuitions of zombies and transposed qualia may seem to raise irresistible objections; Kirk shows that the
intuitions are false. As to the explanatory gap, there is certainly an epistemic gap, but it has a physicalistically acceptable explanation which deals effectively with the problem of how the physical and functional facts fix particular phenomenal facts.
Author: Robert Kirk
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
Published: 04/05/2013
Pages: 252
Binding Type: Hardcover
Weight: 1.10lbs
Size: 9.20h x 6.40w x 0.80d
ISBN: 9780199669417
About the Author
Robert Kirk is Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the University of Nottingham. His other books are Translation Determined (OUP, 1986), Raw Feeling (OUP, 1994), Relativism and Reality (Routledge, 1999), Mind and Body (Acumen, 2003), and Zombies and Consciousness (OUP, 2005).
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