Designing Federalism: A Theory of Self-Sustainable Federal Institutions

The design of federal states from Russia and the Ukraine to Canada and the European Union typically develops from a false set of assumptions regarding the institutional building blocks of such a state. Rather than any carefully delineated allocation of policy jurisdictions, the authors argue that a number of institutional variables, not normally associated with federal design, can be critical in determining federal success. (The variables are the content of regional charters and the extent to which public offices are filled by election rather than appointment.)

Author: Mikhail Filippov, Peter C. Ordeshook, Olga Shvetsova
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Published: 02/09/2004
Pages: 398
Binding Type: Paperback
Weight: 1.17lbs
Size: 9.14h x 6.08w x 0.96d
ISBN: 9780521016483

Review Citation(s):
Choice 07/01/2004 pg. 2123