Hamilton's Paradox: The Promise and Peril of Fiscal Federalism

As new federations take shape and old ones are revived around the world, a difficult challenge is to create incentives for fiscal discipline. A key question is whether a politically-motivated central government can credibly commit not to bail out subnational governments in times of crisis if it funds most of their expenditures. By combining theory, quantitative analysis, and historical and contemporary case studies, this book provides a new perspective on why different countries have had dramatically different experiences with subnational fiscal discipline.

Author: Jonathan A. Rodden
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Published: 12/26/2005
Pages: 336
Binding Type: Paperback
Weight: 0.98lbs
Size: 8.98h x 5.92w x 0.80d
ISBN: 9780521603669

About the Author
Rodden, Jonathan A.: - Jonathan Rodden is the Ford Career Development Associate Professor of Political Science at MIT, and was recently a visiting scholar at the Center for Basic Research in the Social Sciences at Harvard University. He received his Ph.D. in political science from Yale University, his B.A. from the University of Michigan, and was a Fulbright Fellow at the University of Leipzig. In collaboration with the World Bank, he recently co-edited a book entitled Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints (MIT Press 2003). His articles have appeared in journals including The American Journal of Political Science, The British Journal of Political Science, Comparative Politics, International Organization, The Virginia Law Review, and World Politics.

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