Macrocognition: A Theory of Distributed Minds and Collective Intentionality
Macrocognition: A Theory of Distributed Minds and Collective Intentionality
individual interests. But genuinely collective mentality remains a seductive possibility. This book develops a novel approach to distributed cognition and collective intentionality. It argues that genuine cognition requires the capacity to engage in flexible goal-directed behavior, and that this requires specialized representational systems that are integrated in a way that yields fluid
and skillful coping with environmental contingencies. In line with this argument, the book claims that collective mentality should be posited where and only where specialized subroutines are integrated to yields goal-directed behavior that is sensitive to the concerns that are relevant to a group as
such. Unlike traditional claims about collective intentionality, this approach reveals that there are many kinds of collective minds: some groups have cognitive capacities that are more like those that we find in honeybees or cats than they are like those that we find in people. Indeed, groups are
unlikely to be believers in the fullest sense of the term, and understanding why this is the case sheds new light on questions about collective intentionality and collective responsibility.
Author: Bryce Huebner
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
Published: 12/24/2013
Pages: 304
Binding Type: Hardcover
Weight: 1.15lbs
Size: 9.30h x 6.30w x 1.20d
ISBN: 9780199926275
Review Citation(s):
Choice 07/01/2014
About the Author
Bryce Huebner is an associate professor at Georgetown University. He completed a PhD at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill and did postdoctoral research in psychology at Harvard University and in the Center for Cognitive Studies at Tufts University (working with Dan Dennett). He has published both theoretical and empirical research, in philosophy and the cognitive sciences. He is currently engaged in research on moral cognition, reinforcement learning, and the possibility of epistemic accountability in distributed cognitive systems.
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