Oxford University Press, USA
Normative Externalism
Normative Externalism
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Normative Externalism argues that it is not important that people live up to their own principles. What matters, in both ethics and epistemology, is that they live up to the correct principles: that they do the right thing, and that they believe rationally. This stance, that what matters are
the correct principles, not one's own principles, has implications across ethics and epistemology. In ethics, it undermines the ideas that moral uncertainty should be treated just like factual uncertainty, that moral ignorance frequently excuses moral wrongdoing, and that hypocrisy is a vice. In
epistemology, it suggests we need new treatments of higher-order evidence, and of peer disagreement, and of circular reasoning, and the book suggests new approaches to each of these problems. Although the debates in ethics and in epistemology are often conducted separately, putting them in one place
helps bring out their common themes. One common theme is that the view that one should live up to one's own principles looks less attractive when people have terrible principles, or when following their own principles would lead to riskier or more aggressive action than the correct principles.
Another common theme is that asking people to live up to their principles leads to regresses. It can be hard to know what action or belief complies with one's principles. And now we can ask, in such a case should a person do what they think their principles require, or what their principles actually
require? Both answers lead to problems, and the best way to avoid these problems is to simply say people should follow the correct principles.
Author: Brian Weatherson
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
Published: 05/19/2019
Pages: 272
Binding Type: Hardcover
Weight: 1.20lbs
Size: 9.30h x 6.30w x 0.90d
ISBN: 9780199696536
the correct principles, not one's own principles, has implications across ethics and epistemology. In ethics, it undermines the ideas that moral uncertainty should be treated just like factual uncertainty, that moral ignorance frequently excuses moral wrongdoing, and that hypocrisy is a vice. In
epistemology, it suggests we need new treatments of higher-order evidence, and of peer disagreement, and of circular reasoning, and the book suggests new approaches to each of these problems. Although the debates in ethics and in epistemology are often conducted separately, putting them in one place
helps bring out their common themes. One common theme is that the view that one should live up to one's own principles looks less attractive when people have terrible principles, or when following their own principles would lead to riskier or more aggressive action than the correct principles.
Another common theme is that asking people to live up to their principles leads to regresses. It can be hard to know what action or belief complies with one's principles. And now we can ask, in such a case should a person do what they think their principles require, or what their principles actually
require? Both answers lead to problems, and the best way to avoid these problems is to simply say people should follow the correct principles.
Author: Brian Weatherson
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
Published: 05/19/2019
Pages: 272
Binding Type: Hardcover
Weight: 1.20lbs
Size: 9.30h x 6.30w x 0.90d
ISBN: 9780199696536
About the Author
Brian Weatherson, Marshall M. Weinberg Professor of Philosophy, University of Michigan
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