Oxford University Press, USA
Philosophy of Mathematics: Structure and Ontology
Philosophy of Mathematics: Structure and Ontology
Regular price
€72,95 EUR
Regular price
Sale price
€72,95 EUR
Unit price
per
Shipping calculated at checkout.
Couldn't load pickup availability
Do numbers, sets, and so forth, exist? What do mathematical statements mean? Are they literally true or false, or do they lack truth values altogether? Addressing questions that have attracted lively debate in recent years, Stewart Shapiro contends that standard realist and antirealist
accounts of mathematics are both problematic. As Benacerraf first noted, we are confronted with the following powerful dilemma. The desired continuity between mathematical and, say, scientific language suggests realism, but realism in this context suggests seemingly intractable epistemic problems. As a way out of this dilemma, Shapiro
articulates a structuralist approach. On this view, the subject matter of arithmetic, for example, is not a fixed domain of numbers independent of each other, but rather is the natural number structure, the pattern common to any system of objects that has an initial object and successor relation
satisfying the induction principle. Using this framework, realism in mathematics can be preserved without troublesome epistemic consequences. Shapiro concludes by showing how a structuralist approach can be applied to wider philosophical questions such as the nature of an object and the Quinean nature of ontological commitment. Clear, compelling, and tautly argued, Shapiro's work, noteworthy both in its attempt to develop a full-length
structuralist approach to mathematics and to trace its emergence in the history of mathematics, will be of deep interest to both philosophers and mathematicians.
Author: Stewart Shapiro
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
Published: 09/28/2000
Pages: 296
Binding Type: Paperback
Weight: 0.95lbs
Size: 9.08h x 6.30w x 0.73d
ISBN: 9780195139303
accounts of mathematics are both problematic. As Benacerraf first noted, we are confronted with the following powerful dilemma. The desired continuity between mathematical and, say, scientific language suggests realism, but realism in this context suggests seemingly intractable epistemic problems. As a way out of this dilemma, Shapiro
articulates a structuralist approach. On this view, the subject matter of arithmetic, for example, is not a fixed domain of numbers independent of each other, but rather is the natural number structure, the pattern common to any system of objects that has an initial object and successor relation
satisfying the induction principle. Using this framework, realism in mathematics can be preserved without troublesome epistemic consequences. Shapiro concludes by showing how a structuralist approach can be applied to wider philosophical questions such as the nature of an object and the Quinean nature of ontological commitment. Clear, compelling, and tautly argued, Shapiro's work, noteworthy both in its attempt to develop a full-length
structuralist approach to mathematics and to trace its emergence in the history of mathematics, will be of deep interest to both philosophers and mathematicians.
Author: Stewart Shapiro
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
Published: 09/28/2000
Pages: 296
Binding Type: Paperback
Weight: 0.95lbs
Size: 9.08h x 6.30w x 0.73d
ISBN: 9780195139303
About the Author
Stewart Shapiro is Professor of Philosophy at Ohio State University at Newark and the University of St. Andrews, Scotland.
This title is not returnable
