Against Absolute Goodness
Against Absolute Goodness
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Are there things we should value because they are, quite simply, good? If so, such things might be said to have absolute goodness. They would be good simpliciter or full stop - not good for someone, not good of a kind, but nonetheless good (period). They might also be called impersonal
values. The reason why we ought to value such things, if there are any, would merely be the fact that they are, quite simply, good things. In the twentieth century, G. E. Moore was the great champion of absolute goodness, but he is not the only philosopher who posits the existence and importance
of this property. Against these friends of absolute goodness, Richard Kraut here builds on the argument he made in What is Good and Why, demonstrating that goodness is not a reason-giving property - in fact, there may be no such thing. It is, he holds, an insidious category of practical thought, because it can be and
has been used to justify what is harmful and condemn what is beneficial. Impersonal value draws us away from what is good for persons. His strategy for opposing absolute goodness is to search for domains of practical reasoning in which it might be thought to be needed, and this leads him to an
examination of a wide variety of moral phenomena: pleasure, knowledge, beauty, love, cruelty, suicide, future generations, bio-diversity, killing in self-defense, and the extinction of our species. Even persons, he proposes, should not be said to have absolute value. The special importance of human
life rests instead on the great advantages that such lives normally offer. When one reads this, one sees the possibility of real philosophical progress. If Kraut is right, I'd be wrong to say that this book is good, period. Or even great, period. But I will say that, as a work of philosophy, and for those who read it, it is excellent indeed. --Russ Shafer-Landau,
University of Wisconsin-Madison
Author: Richard Kraut
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
Published: 12/02/2011
Pages: 240
Binding Type: Hardcover
Weight: 0.80lbs
Size: 8.40h x 5.80w x 1.10d
ISBN: 9780199844463
values. The reason why we ought to value such things, if there are any, would merely be the fact that they are, quite simply, good things. In the twentieth century, G. E. Moore was the great champion of absolute goodness, but he is not the only philosopher who posits the existence and importance
of this property. Against these friends of absolute goodness, Richard Kraut here builds on the argument he made in What is Good and Why, demonstrating that goodness is not a reason-giving property - in fact, there may be no such thing. It is, he holds, an insidious category of practical thought, because it can be and
has been used to justify what is harmful and condemn what is beneficial. Impersonal value draws us away from what is good for persons. His strategy for opposing absolute goodness is to search for domains of practical reasoning in which it might be thought to be needed, and this leads him to an
examination of a wide variety of moral phenomena: pleasure, knowledge, beauty, love, cruelty, suicide, future generations, bio-diversity, killing in self-defense, and the extinction of our species. Even persons, he proposes, should not be said to have absolute value. The special importance of human
life rests instead on the great advantages that such lives normally offer. When one reads this, one sees the possibility of real philosophical progress. If Kraut is right, I'd be wrong to say that this book is good, period. Or even great, period. But I will say that, as a work of philosophy, and for those who read it, it is excellent indeed. --Russ Shafer-Landau,
University of Wisconsin-Madison
Author: Richard Kraut
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
Published: 12/02/2011
Pages: 240
Binding Type: Hardcover
Weight: 0.80lbs
Size: 8.40h x 5.80w x 1.10d
ISBN: 9780199844463
About the Author
Richard Kraut was educated at the University of Michigan and Princeton University. He has taught in the Philosophy Departments at the University of Illinois at Chicago, and Northwestern University, where he is Charles E. and Emma H. Morrison Professor in the Humanities.
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