Strategy on the United States Supreme Court

To what extent do the justices on the Supreme Court behave strategically? In Strategy on the United States Supreme Court, Saul Brenner and Joseph M. Whitmeyer investigate the answers to this question and reveal that justices are substantially less strategic than many Supreme Court scholars believe. By examining the research to date on each of the justice's important activities, Brenner and Whitmeyer's work shows that the justices often do not cast their certiorari votes in accord with the outcome-prediction strategy, that the other members of the conference coalition bargain successfully with the majority opinion writer in less than 6 percent of the situations, and that most of the fluidity in voting on the Court is nonstrategic. This work is essential to understanding how strategic behavior - or its absence - influences the decisions of the Supreme Court and, as a result, American politics and society.

Author: Saul Brenner, Joseph M. Whitmeyer
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Published: 02/16/2009
Pages: 208
Binding Type: Hardcover
Weight: 0.80lbs
Size: 8.50h x 5.60w x 0.80d
ISBN: 9780521516723

Review Citation(s):
Choice 10/01/2009

About the Author
Brenner, Saul: - Saul Brenner is a Professor of Political Science at UNC Charlotte. He has published extensively regarding fluidity in voting on the Supreme Court, strategic voting at the cert vote, and majority opinion assignment. In 2007 he was awarded the Lifetime Achievement Award by the Law and Courts Section of the American Political Science Association.Whitmeyer, Joseph M.: - Joseph M. Whitmeyer is a Professor of Sociology at UNC Charlotte. He has published concerning small-group processes in journals such as Social Psychology Quarterly and Sociological Theory. He has been a visiting professor at the University of Hokkaido (Japan) and at the University of Groningen (the Netherlands).