To what extent do the justices on the Supreme Court behave strategically? In Strategy on the United States Supreme Court, Saul Brenner and Joseph M. Whitmeyer investigate the answers to this question and reveal that justices are substantially less strategic than many Supreme Court scholars believe. By examining the research to date on each of the justice's important activities, Brenner and Whitmeyer's work shows that the justices often do not cast their certiorari votes in accord with the outcome-prediction strategy, that the other members of the conference coalition bargain successfully with the majority opinion writer in less than 6 percent of the situations, and that most of the fluidity in voting on the Court is nonstrategic. This work is essential to understanding how strategic behavior - or its absence - influences the decisions of the Supreme Court and, as a result, American politics and society.
Author: Saul Brenner, Joseph M. Whitmeyer Publisher: Cambridge University Press Published: 02/16/2009 Pages: 208 Binding Type: Hardcover Weight: 0.80lbs Size: 8.50h x 5.60w x 0.80d ISBN: 9780521516723
Review Citation(s): Choice 10/01/2009
About the Author Brenner, Saul: - Saul Brenner is a Professor of Political Science at UNC Charlotte. He has published extensively regarding fluidity in voting on the Supreme Court, strategic voting at the cert vote, and majority opinion assignment. In 2007 he was awarded the Lifetime Achievement Award by the Law and Courts Section of the American Political Science Association.Whitmeyer, Joseph M.: - Joseph M. Whitmeyer is a Professor of Sociology at UNC Charlotte. He has published concerning small-group processes in journals such as Social Psychology Quarterly and Sociological Theory. He has been a visiting professor at the University of Hokkaido (Japan) and at the University of Groningen (the Netherlands).