We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War: The Long War Series Occasional Paper 26

The Combat Studies Institute (CSI) is pleased to present Long War Series Occasional Paper 26, "We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War" by CSI historian Mr. Matt M. Matthews. The outcome of the war that was, at best, a stalemate for Israel has confounded military analysts throughout the world. Long considered the most professional and powerful army in the Middle East, with a history of impressive military victories against its enemies, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) emerged from the campaign with its enemies undefeated and its prestige severely tarnished. Matthews's historical analysis of the war includes an examination of IDF and Hezbollah doctrine prior to the war, as well as an overview of the operational and tactical problems encountered by the IDF during the war. His research convincingly argues that the Israeli reliance on poorly understood and controversial Effects-Based Operations (EBO) and Systemic Operational Design (SOD) warfighting theories, and a nearly singular dependence on air power, were root causes of Israeli problems. Additionally, after years of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in the Gaza Strip and West Bank territories, IDF ground forces were tactically unprepared and untrained to fight against a determined Hezbollah force that conducted what was, in many ways, a conventional, fixed-position defense. IN research this study, Mr. Matthews interviewed several prominent IDF officers and other experts in the field, many of whom had not previously been interviewed. The result is an insightful, comprehensive examination of the war. In 2006, Hezbollah demonstrated that terrorist groups around the world are capable of learning from, adapting to, and exploiting weaknesses in conventional military forces. Inasmuch as the US Army has focused almost exclusively on irregular warfare since 2001, the lessons offered in this analysis are particularly relevant. We believe that this study will be of great use to the US Army as it conducts current operations and prepares for an uncertain future in which potential enemies are watching and learning.

Author: Combat Studies Institute,Matt M. Matthews
Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
Published: 06/29/2012
Pages: 106
Binding Type: Paperback
Weight: 0.34lbs
Size: 9.02h x 5.98w x 0.22d
ISBN: 9781478161998

About the Author
Matt M. Matthews joined the Combat Studies Institute in July 2005 after working for 16 years as a member of the World Class Opposing Force (OPFOR) for the Battle Command Training Program in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Mr. Matthews graduated from Kansas State University in 1986 with a B.S. in History. HE served as an Infantry enlisted man in the Regular Army from 1977 to 1981; a Cavalry officer in the US Army Reserve from 1983 to 1986; and as an Armor officer in the Kansas Army National Guard from 1986 to 1991. Mr. Matthews is the author of CSI Press publications "The Posse Comitatus Act and the United States Army: A Historical Perspective" and Operation AL FAJR: A Study in Army and Marine Corps Joint Operations" and "The US Army on the Mexican Border: A Historical Perspective." Mr. Matthews has coauthored numerous scholarly articles on the Civil War in the Trans-Mississippi, including "Shot All To Pieces: The Battle of Lone Jack," "To Play a Bold Game: The Battle of Honey Springs," and "Better Off in Hell: The Evolution of the Kansas Red Legs." He is a frequent speaker at the Civil War Roundtables, and he recently appeared on the History Channel as a historian from Bill Kurtis' Investigating History. Mr. Matthews was the mayor and city commissioner of Ottawa, Kansas, from 1993 to 1999.

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